United States
US · actor dossier
Supply-chain position
Heavily import-dependent for separated rare earths and finished magnets, and rebuilding a domestic mine-to-magnet chain. Instruments span USGS critical-mineral designation, BIS export controls, DOE and Defense (DPA Title III) funding, and offtake / price-support arrangements.
Framing posture
Frames policy as economic security, defense-industrial resilience, and reducing dependence on a single foreign supplier.
Framing anchors (19)
How this actor justifies its policy, in its own words.
By working with the mineral industry and state partners, we are ensuring that the minerals powering our energy, defense, and technology supply chains are mined and processed in the United States.
Attributed to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum in the Department of the Interior press release announcing the final 2025 list.
Rebuilding the critical minerals and rare earth magnet sectors of the U.S.
Stated rationale of the DoD–MP Materials partnership as reported by Fortune; frames the equity-and-offtake deal as defense-industrial base rebuilding.
Our national and economic security are now acutely threatened by our reliance upon hostile foreign powers' mineral production.
Purpose clause of the order, verbatim from the Federal Register text. Codes both categories because the sentence names both explicitly. The order does not name China, so no leverage_retaliation is coded: "hostile foreign powers" is the government's own formulation and the tracker does not resolve it to a country the text leaves unnamed.
Critical minerals, including rare earth elements, in the form of processed minerals are essential raw materials and critical production inputs required for economic and national security.
Opening of the section 1 policy statement, verbatim from the Federal Register text. The sentence names economic and national security together, so both are coded.
But processed critical minerals and their derivative products face significant global supply chain vulnerabilities and market distortions due to reliance on a small number of foreign suppliers.
Second paragraph of the section 1 policy statement, verbatim. Kept separate from the national-security anchor because it makes a distinct claim — supplier concentration and market distortion — rather than restating the security rationale.
This dependency of the United States on foreign sources creates a strategic vulnerability for both its economy and military to adverse foreign government action, natural disaster, and other events that can disrupt supply of these key minerals.
From the SUMMARY of the Federal Register notice, verbatim. The sentence places adverse foreign government action alongside natural disaster as one disruption risk among several and names no country, so no leverage or retaliation framing is coded.
I therefore determine that our Nation's undue reliance on critical minerals, in processed or unprocessed form, from foreign adversaries constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
The operative determination and emergency declaration, verbatim from the Federal Register text with the printed line breaks removed and nothing else altered. This is the IEEPA/NEA predicate for the whole order.
Our dependence on one country, the People's Republic of China (China), for multiple critical minerals is particularly concerning.
Verbatim, line breaks removed. Coded with leverage_retaliation because the order itself, in the operative instruction at section 1(a), directs that recommended action "may include the imposition of tariffs or quotas, other import restrictions against China and other non-market foreign adversaries" — the country is named by the government in its own operative text, so the label rests on the document rather than on any inference drawn here. Contrast EO 14241 and EO 14272, which leave the country unnamed and therefore carry no such label.
This 2022 final list of critical minerals is not intended to replace related terms and definitions of minerals that are deemed strategic, critical or otherwise important.
USGS limiting the reach of its own designation. Coded compliance_modernization rather than a security category because the statement is about the instrument's legal scope — that it is a statutory list under section 7002 of the Energy Act of 2020 and not a general-purpose determination — not about why the minerals matter.
Mining a mineral domestically does not safeguard the national security of the United States if the United States remains dependent on a foreign country for the processing of that mineral.
Verbatim from paragraph 6, line breaks removed. The proclamation frames processing, not extraction, as the security chokepoint, the same midstream stage the Australian production tax incentive and the DoD–MP separation loan target. It names no country, so no leverage_retaliation label is applied.
secure a domestic supply chain for the magnets used in chip manufacturing, drones, electric vehicles, fighter jets, industrial motors, nuclear submarines, and satellites
Attributed in the release to Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering Emil Michael.
provides U.S. semiconductor companies a reliable domestic source and removes choke points in their manufacturing supply chain
Bill Frauenhofer, Director of the CHIPS Program, in Commerce's release.
Space-based capabilities are vital to U.S. national security
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy Laura Taylor-Kale in the official award release.
Increasing domestic germanium production is one of the highest industrial base priorities for the DoW.
Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy Mike Cadenazzi in the official release.
establishing a secure, domestic supply chain for this essential ammunition component
Retrospective Army framing in 2026 of the DOTC effort initiated in 2023; not wording attributed to the 2023 SEC filing.
restore domestic industrial capabilities essential to the national defense
DoD description of the DPA Investments Program mission in the award release.
improve the resiliency of our supply chains
Programme-level EXIM framing for the Make More in America Initiative under which the Stibnite loan was approved.
advances North American sourcing of this critical mineral for the defense industrial base
Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy Mike Cadenazzi in the official award release.
Strong domestic mineral supply chains are essential to support our warfighting capability
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Resilience Jeffrey Frankston in the official release.
Events (20)
EXIM final approval of project finance for the Stibnite Gold Project
ActiveDepartment of War DPA support for United States Antimony Corporation
ActiveCommerce's CHIPS Program letter of intent with USA Rare Earth, and the funding and loan guarantee agreements that followed
ActiveAdjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products Into The United States
In forceDepartment of War DPA investment in 5N+ germanium recovery and refining
ActiveOffice of Strategic Capital Agrees to Joint $700M Conditional Loan Commitment with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies
ActiveFinal 2025 List of Critical Minerals
In forceDepartment of War DPA support for Alaska Range Resources' integrated antimony supply chain
ActiveDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
ActiveEnsuring National Security and Economic Resilience Through Section 232 Actions on Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products
In forceImmediate Measures To Increase American Mineral Production
In forceDOE closes $996 million loan guarantee for Rhyolite Ridge lithium processing
ActiveActive Anode Material From the People's Republic of China: antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
EndedDOE closes ATVM loan for Thacker Pass lithium processing facilities
ActiveDoD DPA support for 5N+ space-qualified germanium substrate capacity
ActiveArmy-backed antimony trisulfide pilot and process-development agreement with Perpetua
ActiveDoD Defense Production Act support for Perpetua's Stibnite antimony project
Ended2022 Final List of Critical Minerals
SupersededAddressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries
In forceFinal List of Critical Minerals 2018
SupersededCapital and control
Financial instruments this actor provides and control clauses it issues.
Financial instruments (36)
Open in Capital →Alcoa-Sojitz Gallium Recovery Project
No amount statedGallium recovery at the Alcoa-Sojitz project
Perpetua Resources Idaho, Inc.
aboutUSD27.1 millionDomestic antimony trisulfide process demonstration and modular pilot plant using Stibnite ore
United States Government
at leastUSD1 billionUnited States–Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD277 millionCommerce's CHIPS Program letter of intent with USA Rare Earth, and the funding and loan guarantee agreements that followed
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD60 millionMagnet Project 2
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD15 millionMetal Project 2
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD132 millionRound Top Mine Project
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD50 millionStillwater Magnet Project
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD20 millionStillwater Metal Project
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD1.3 billionCommerce's CHIPS Program letter of intent with USA Rare Earth, and the funding and loan guarantee agreements that followed
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD325 millionMagnet Project 2
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD75 millionMetal Project 2
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD550 millionRound Top Mine Project
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD250 millionStillwater Magnet Project
↳ part of the row above
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
up toUSD100 millionStillwater Metal Project
US Department of Commerce, CHIPS Program Office
USD50 millionPurchase of equipment, in parallel with OSC's financing
5N+ Semiconductors
USD14.4 millionAnnouncedSt. George space-qualified germanium substrate capacity expansion
MP Materials Corp.
up toUSD350 millionDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
MP 10X Development, LLC (project company established to develop the 10X Facility)
No amount statedSecond domestic magnet manufacturing facility
MP Materials Corp.
USD400 millionDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
MP Materials Corp.
No amount statedDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
Perpetua Resources Idaho, Inc.
up toUSD59.2 millionStibnite Gold Project
Ioneer Rhyolite Ridge LLC
USD996 millionRhyolite Ridge on-site lithium processing facility
Lithium Nevada LLC (formerly Lithium Nevada Corp.)
aboutUSD2.23 billionThacker Pass Phase 1 lithium carbonate processing facilities
5N Plus Inc.
USD18.1 millionSt. George germanium recovery and refining expansion
Alaska Range Resources, LLC
USD43.4 millionEstelle Gold and Critical Minerals Project — integrated antimony supply chain
United States Antimony Corporation
USD27 millionThompson Falls facility expansion and related Alaska antimony mining integration
↳ part of the row above
United States Antimony Corporation
USD7 millionAlaska antimony mining and feedstock development
↳ part of the row above
United States Antimony Corporation
USD20 millionThompson Falls antimony processing and refining expansion
Perpetua Resources Idaho, Inc.
USD2.906 billionStibnite Gold Project
US Department of Defense, Office of Strategic Capital
USD500 millionDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
US Department of Defense, Office of Strategic Capital
up toUSD100 billionDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
↳ drawn from the row above
MP Materials Corp.
USD150 millionSamarium Project: expansion of heavy rare earth separation, including separation of samarium oxide
↳ drawn from the row above
Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies
USD700 millionOffice of Strategic Capital Agrees to Joint $700M Conditional Loan Commitment with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies
↳ part of the row above
ReElement Technologies
USD80 millionOffice of Strategic Capital Agrees to Joint $700M Conditional Loan Commitment with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies
↳ part of the row above
Vulcan Elements
USD620 millionOffice of Strategic Capital Agrees to Joint $700M Conditional Loan Commitment with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies
Control clauses (6)
Open in Controls →Trade investigation · Investigation No. 731-TA-1730
Investigation concludedInvestigation Nos. 701-TA-752 and 731-TA-1730; FR Docs. 2025-00656, 2025-00657, 2026-06488
Trade investigation · Investigation No. 701-TA-752
Investigation concludedInvestigation Nos. 701-TA-752 and 731-TA-1730; FR Docs. 2025-00656, 2025-00657, 2026-06488
Contractual ownership covenant · Funding Agreements, covenants (iv) and (xi)
In forceCommerce's CHIPS Program letter of intent with USA Rare Earth, and the funding and loan guarantee agreements that followed
Contractual ownership covenant · Transaction Agreement, Specified Period covenants
In forceDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
End-use restriction · PPA and Offtake Agreement, Restricted Buyers
In forceDoD–MP Materials public-private partnership for rare earth magnet supply
Trade investigation · Sec. 3
Investigation concludedExecutive Order 14272; 90 FR 16437 (FR Doc. 2025-06836)
